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RECOVERY IN QUANTUM MERUIT AFTER NEGLIGENT FAIL-
URE TO PERFORAM AN ENTIRE CONTRACT-MEASURE OF RECOVERY.
-The right of a party who has broken his indivisible contract
without legal excuse, but not wilfully, to recover for such benefit
as he may have conferred on the other party by part performance
is not easy to work out. Two legal principles seem in conflict:
the one forbids a plaintiff in material default to recover, and the
other allows recovery to prevent an unjust forfeiture.' The re-
covery, where it is allowed, is not on the contract but in quasi
'3 Williston, Contracts, Chap. XL, especially at sec. 1473. H. W.
Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINNESOTA LAW RE-
VIEW 329. The discussion in this note is limited to those cases in which
the plaintiff's breach of contract is merely negligent.
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contract, on the ground that the defendant should not be un-
justly enriched.!
In their decisions the courts are not in harmony as to the
measure of recovery and frequently their statements are iniac-
curate.' On principle it would appear that if a recovery is al-
lowed it should be measured by that which will leave the defend-
ant in the same situation as if he had recovered damages for
breach of the contract.' As the court points out in Michigan
Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch,' "In justice the defendants have no
right to more of tae money than will compensate them for loss
by reason of the plaintiff's refusal to carry out the contract."
The authorities show that in many cases the plaintiff recovers
the contract price less the damages resulting to the defendant from
the plaintiff's breach, or less the cost to the defendant of complet-
ing the work.' Such a statement of the recovery fails to distin-
guish the situation under discussion from recovery on the contract
as for substantial performance. Another statement of the meas-
ure of recovery is that the plaintiff is entitled to the value
of the part performance, not exceeding the contract price,
less the damages suffered by the defendant. The value of the
part performance must be the value to the defendant and that is
said to be "the fair market value of the thing produced," not ex-
ceeding the contract price." Where the contract is merely un-
finished, but readily capable of completion, the measure of re-
covery should be limited to the reasonable value of the plaintiff's
part performance, not exceeding such portion of the contract
price for full performance as the value of the part performance
bears to the value of full performance, less th , damages result-
ing to the defendant from the plaintiff's breach.1
2McCurry v. Purgason, (1915) 17o N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244, Ann. Cas.
19i8A 907.
'3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 148o; Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec.
178.
'Britton v. Turner, (1834) 6 N. H. 481, 487, 26 Am. Dec. 713.
'(i9o6) 143 Fed. 929.
'Hayward v. Leonard, (1828) 7 Pick. (Mass.) 181; Woodward,
Quasi Contracts, sec. 178, p. 282 and cases cited. See, however, Gillis
v. Cobe, (19oi) 177 Mass. 584, 59 N. E. 455.
'McClay v. Hedge, (1864) 8 Ia. 66; Hillyard v. Crabtree's Adm'r.,
(1854) 11 Tex. 264, 62 Am. Dec. 475.
'Woodward, Quasi Contracts, sec. 178; 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. r475.
'United States v. Molloy, (19o6) 144 Fed. 321, 75 C. C. A. 283, II L.
R. A. (N.S.) 487.
"
0Gillis v. Cobe, (igoi) 177 Mass. 584, 59 N. E. 455; 3 Williston, Con-
tracts. secs. 1483 and 1485.
NOTES
Just how to compute the defendant's damage is a point upon
which the courts are not in harmony. Where the thing produc-
ed is incapable of being made to conform to the contract without
its entire demolition, and where the acceptance was involuntary
or was made only through necessity, as in the case of improve-
ments to real estate, and an action is allowed the plaintiff in quasi
contract, the damages to the defendant, according to a Vermont
decision," should be such a sum as will fully compensate tne de-
fendant for the imperfection in the work, so that he will be placed
in as good a position pecuniarily as if the contract had beetn
strictly performed. After deducting this amount, the remainder
is payable to the plaintiff for his part performance.
According to Professor Williston, the defendant should be al-
lowed as damages, by recoupment or counterclaim, the difference
between the contract price of the building (or other performance)
and the cost in the market of making such a building,'3 this rule
of damages to apply in every case in which the plaintiff, failing
to perform his contract, sues in quantum meruit. It is assumed
that the defendant has paid for something totally different from
what the contract called for, and that it therefore stands totally
unperformed.' This theory of the measure of damages may be
correct where the assumption is supported by the facts, but has
not been followed, nor in justice should it be, where the part per-
formance has been in substantial compliance with the contract
and has therefore mitigated the damages that would flow from
a breach of the contract.
JOINT ADVENTURES-PARTNERSHIPS.-A joint adventure has
been defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry
out a single business enterprise for profit."' At common law
"Woodward, Quasi Contracts, see. 178, p. 285; 3 Williston, Con-
tracts, sec. 1485, p. 2642; 3 Sutherland on Damages, 3d. Ed., sec. 711,
p. 2167.
'Kelly v. Bradford, (x86o) 33 Vt. 35; 3 Sutherland on Damages, 3d.
Ed., sec. 711, p. 2168.
33 Williston, Cohtracts, see. 1484; Eaton v. Gladwell, (1899) 121
Mich. 444, 8o N. W. 292; City of Sherman v. Connor, (1895) 88 Tex. 35,
29 S. W. 1053.
143 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1484.
'2 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 975, P. 1339. A joint
adventure is also defined as "an enterprise undertaken by several per-
sons jointly," 23 Cyc. 452, and as an enterprise arising "by contract or
agreement between the parties to join their efforts in furtherance of a
particular transaction or series of transactions," Nat. Surety Co. v.
Winslow, (1919) 143 Minn. 66, 71, 173 N. W. i81.
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co-adventurers in an enterprise were recognized in the courts
only when the element of partnership was disclosed, and upon
proof of the essentials of a partnershi. 2  Now, however, the
courts hold that a joint adventure may exist where parties en-
gage in a common enterprise- for their mutual benefit without
entering into a strict partnership relation.' In its general nature,
the "venture" is similar to a partnership and is governed largely
by the same rules of law,' but the two are not identical,' and
several points of difference deserve attention.
A joint adventure usually relates to a single transaction, al-
though that transaction may comprehend a business to be con-
tinued for several years, while a partnership relates to a general
business of some particular kind.! However, a partnership may
be created for the consummation of a single transaction,' and ac-
cordingly it has been held in one jurisdiction that a joint adven-
ture is merely a partnership of limited scope and duration.' In
jurisdictions where the Uniform Partnership Act has not been
adopted, a corporation is incapable of becoming a partner,' but it
may bind itself by a contract for a joint adventure, the purpose
of which is within the scope of the corporate business."°
One of the essentials or results of the partnership relation is
that each partner is the agent for the other partners and the part-
nership in the partnership business." In a joint adventure, the
2-Goss v. Lanin, (915) 17o Ia. 57, 6I, 15:2 N. W. 43.
'Jackson v. Hooper, (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 185, 197, 74 Ati. 13o; Sanders
v. Newman, (Wis. 1921) 181 N. W. 822.
'Butler v. Union Trust Co., (1918) 178 Cal. 195, 172 Pac. 6ol; Cain
v. Hubble, (1919) 184 Ky. 38, 211 S. W. 413, 6 A. L. R. 146; Menefee
v. Oxnam, (1gig) 42 Cal. App. 8I, 183 Pac. 379.
"Hurley v. Walton, (1872) 63 Ill. 26o; Williams v. Gillies, (1878) 75
N. Y. 197; 2 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 975, P. 1339. Bush
v. Haire, (1917) 197 Mich. 85, 163 N. W. 875, a bill framed on the
theory of a partnership was dismissed for want of proof of a partner-
ship, without prejudice to the plaintiff to institute proceedings on the
theory of joint adventure.
623 Cyc. 453; 2 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 975, p. 1340.
'Bates v. Babcock, (1892) 95 Cal. 479, 30 Pac. 6o5, 16 L. R. A. 745,
29 A. S. R. 133.0
"A joint adventure is a limited partnership; not limited in a stat-
utory sense as to liability, but as to its scope and duration; and under
our law joint adventures and partnerships are governed by the same
rules." Ross v. Willett, (1894) 76 Hun (N. Y.) 211, 27 N. Y. S. 785.
Pi Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, secs. 193, 194, P. 197. Under
the Uniform Partnership Act a corporation may be a partner.
"Mestier & Co. v. Chevalier Paving Co., (igol) io8 La. 562, 32 So.
520.
2'1Flarsbeim v. Brestrup, (i8go) 43 Minn. 298, 45 N. W. 438; Harvey
v. Childs, (1876) 28 Ohio St. 319, 22 Am. Rep. 387; Pahlman v. Taylor,
NO TES
authority of one associate to bind the others contractually as the
mere result of the relation is more doubtful." A joint adven-
turer can bind his associates in a matter respecting which express
or apparent authority is given," and it has been stated that each
one of the parties has the power to bind the others in matters
which are strictly within the scope of the enterprise," but the
power is more restricted than that of a partner in a general busi-
ness." In one case where the parties were held not to be partners
because neither had the power to bind the other, the court held
them to be joint adventurers on the theory that no mutual agency
exists in the latter relation." This case, however, goes farther
than most decisions, and has been so criticised by one writer.'
The principal distinction between a partnership and a joint
adventure is said to be that, in the latter, one party may sue the
other at law for a breach of the contract, a share of the profits, or
a contribution for advances made in excess of his share," whereas
a partner cannot sue his co-partner at law upon matters involving
partnership transactions, but must look to equity for relief." It
should be noted, however, that the general rule in partnership is
held not to apply and an action at law is allowed where the part-
nership is for a single transaction and no accounting is necessary,
i. e., where the partnership is similar in form to a joint adven-
ture. " Thus any distinction based on the nature of the remedies
between parties seems unjustifiably drawn.
(1874) 75 Ill. 629; Mechem, Partnership, 2nd Ed., sec. 244, p. 217. The
Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 9 (1), is to the same effect.
'Donahue v. Haskamp, (I920) iog Wash. 562, 187 Pac. 346; 'Mechem,
Partnership, 2nd Ed., sec. 245, p. 218.
"Jones v. Gould, (913) 209 N. Y. 419, io3 N. E. 720.
"Anderson v. Weber, (1914) 148 N. Y. S. 133.
2 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 98o, p. 1349.
"Jackson v. Hooper, (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 185, 74 Atl. 130.72 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 98o, p. 1350.
"23 Cyc. 453; Hurley v. Walton, (1872) 63 Ill. 26o; see also Saunders
v. McDonough, (914) 191 Ala. nP9, 67 So. 591. It should be noted that
the remedy at law does not preclude a suit in equity for an accounting.
Botsford v. Van Riper, (I9IO) 33 Nev. 156, 196, 11o Pac. 7o5; Saunders
v. McDonough, (1914) 191 Ala. iig, 67 So. 591; Harvey v. Sellers,
(902) 115 Fed. 757; Reece v. Rhoades, (1917) 25 Wyo. 91, 165 Pac. 449;
Keyes v. Nims, (Cal. App. igig) 184 Pac. 695; Mechem, Partnership,
2nd Ed., sec. 2o6, p. 187.
"Mechem, Partnership, 2nd Ed., secs. 203, 221; 2 Rowley, Modern
Law of Partnership, sec. 743, p. 1O29; Burdick, Partnership, 2nd Ed., p.
333; Noyes v. Ostrom, (191o) 113 Minn. 111, 129 N. W. 142, action be-
tveen firms having a common partner.
'Mechem, Partnership, 2nd Ed., secs. 205, 2o6, p. 187; 2 Rowley,
Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 748, p. 1O38; Burdick, Partnership,
2nd Ed., p. 336.
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A contract of joint adventure need not be express, but may
be implied from the conduct of the parties.' The mutual prom-
ises of the parties to give their aid and assistance in furthering
the adventure are sufficient consideration to support the contract."
The presumption is that the profits arising from a joint adventure
are to be divided equally among the joint adventurers, without
regard to any inequality of contribution.' although the proportion
in which profits are to be shared may of course be fixed by con-
tract.2' Parties to a joint adventure stand in a fiduciary relation
to each other, similar to that existing between partners. It is
therefore improper for any one of the parties to acquire a secret
advantage, and he will be held strictly to account to his co-adven-
turers for any secret profits.' If title to property purchased with
funds contributed for the joint adventure is taken in the" name
of one party, he holds it as trustee for the other adventurers,' and
"
1Hoge v. George, (Wyo. 1921) 200 Pac. 96; 23 Cyc. 453.
'See Alderton v. Williams, (19o5) 139 Mich. 296, 1O2 N. W. 753.
Thus where plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed to secure an option
and defendant furnished the capital and did the work, plaintiff merely
giving advice and suggestions, the agreement was held a sufficient con-
sideration to support the contract and plaintiff recovered a share of the
profits. Botsford v. Van Riper, (191o) 33 Nev. 156, 191, IIO Pac. 705.
"Lind v. Webber, (1913) 36 Nev. 623, 134 Pac. 461, 5o L. R. A. (N.S.)
lO46, Ann. Cas. I9i6A 12o2 and note; Hoge v. George, (Wyo. 1921) 200
Pac. 96. These cases hold, of course, that money advanced by one
party to the joint adventure is a loan for which the party is entitled to
be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the venture. See also Buckmaster
v. Grundy, (1846) 8 I1. 626. The same rule applies to sharing losses
as to sharing profits, i. e., they'are to be divided equally between the
parties. Claflin v. Godfrey, (1838) 21 Pick. (Mass,) I, 15; see also
Hoge v. George, (Wyo. 1921) 200 Pac. 96, 99. It has been held that
where one party furnished the capital and the other the services, the lat-
ter was not liable for any part of the losses. Rau & Rieke v. Boyle &
Boyle, (1868) 5 Bush (Ky.) 253.2Hammel v. Feigh, (1919) 143 Minn. 115, 173 N. W. 570. Where
the parties consisted of a firm of two partners and a third person, the
profits of the venture were divided into two parts, one for the firm and
one for the other party. Warner v. Smith, (1863) 32 L. J. Ch. (N.S.)
573, 8 L. T. (N.S.) 221, II W. R. 392.
'Church v. Odell, (i9o7) zoo Minn. 98, iio N. W. 346; Gasser v.
Wall, (191o) 111 Minn. 6, 126 N. W. 284, aff'd in 115 Minn. 59, 131 N.
W. 85o; Jones v. Kinney, (1911) 146 Wis. 130, 131 N. W. 339, Ann. Cas.
1912C 2oo and note; Menefee v. Oxnam, (i9i9) 42 Cal. App. 81, 183
Pac. 379; Sanders v. Newman, (Wis. 1921) 181 N. W. 822. See also
Nelson v. Lindsey, (1917) 179 Ia. 862, 162 N. W. 3. For a discussion
of the liability imposed upon third persons dealing with joint adven-
turers, see 4 MINNESOTA LAW REViEW 299; also Selwyn & Co. v. Waller,
(1914) 212 N. Y. 5o7, lo6 N. E. 321, L. R. A. 1915B 16o.
'Irvine v. Campbell, (1913) 121 Minn. 192, 141 N. W. Io8, Ann. Cas.
1914C 689. See also Botsford v. Van Riper, (i91o) 33 Nev. i56, 191,
11o Pac. 705.
NOTES
property bought with the proceeds of a joint adventure belongs to
all the adventurers as joint property. If no date is fixed by the
contract for the termination of the adventure, the agreement re-
mains in force until the purpose is accomplished, and neither party
can end it at will,2 nor will equity dissolve the joint adventure
for any cause other than those which justify the dissolution of
partnerships."
TAXATION-VALUATION OF CAPITAL STOCK AND FRANCHISE
OF A CORPORATION-INDEBTEDNESS.-One of the most serious
difficulties encountered in working out rules for the taxation of
corporations, has been the proper disposal of the corporate in-
debtedness in evaluating the capital stock of the corporation. Vari-
ous courts have adopted different rules which can be generally
classified as follows: first, those which deduct the indebtedness
from the value of the capital stock;' second, those which do not
consider the indebtedness at all ; and third, those which add the
indebtedness to the value of the capital stock.'
The intention of the law is to tax corporations in the same
manner as individuals are taxed, so that taxes shall be uniform
and equal.' In the absence of statutes there can be no deduction
of the indebtedness of either the individual or the corporation,:
and a statute giving a corporation the right to deduct its indebted-
ness is unconstitutional when the same right is not given to the
individual." Each state has different rules for assessment to
apply under varying circumstances. When the market value of
"Saunders Y. McDonough, (1914) 191 Ala. 119, 13o, 67 So. 591, aff'd in
201 Ala. 321, 78 So. i6o, ii A. L. R. 419; Hubbell v. Buhler, (1887) 43
Hun (N. Y.) 82; 2 Rowley, 'Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 988, p.
136o; Lindley, Partnership, 7th Ed., p. 143.
'Hubbell v. Buhler, (1887) 43 Hun (N. Y.) 82; Marston v. Gould,(1877) 69 N. Y. 220, joint adventure terminable at will.
'People ex rel. S. A. R. R. Co. v. Barker, (1894) 141 N. Y. 196, 36 N.
E. 184.
'Commonwealth v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., (1898) 188 Pa. i69, 191, 41
Atl. 594, and cases following. The indebtedness -is here held to be a rele-
vant fact tending to reduce the value of the stock, although not to be
specifically deducted.
'State Board of Equalization v. People, (90) 191 Ill. 528, 549, 61
N. E. 339, 58 L. R. A. 513, and note, p. 577, 599. For a later note, see
L. R. A. 19i5C 380.
'437 Cyc 1029; Cooley, Taxation, 3d Ed., p. 273.
"See Re Oklahoma Nat. L. Ins. Co., (Okla. 1918) 173 Pac. 376, 13
A. L. R. 174. 184.
'State v. Duluth Gas & Water Co., (1899) 76 Minn. 96, 104, 78 N. W.
1032, 57 L. R. A. 63; State v. Karr, (I9O2) 64 Neb. 514, 90 N. W. 298.
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the capital stock is not readily ascertainable, the assessment may
be made by adding together the value of all the property, real and
personal, tangible and intangible, including all assets and the fran-
chise, and in the absence of statute, no deduction of the in-
debtedness should be allowed under this rule.' But when the
capital stock of a corporation has a market value, or a cash value,
many states adojpt this value as the basis of the assessment,' and
then the question of the disposal of the indebtedness becomes
more complex.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to determine what is
meant by the terms market value, actual value, or cash value of
the capital stock. These different expressions, found in various
statutes, amount to the same thing, and are indirectly determined
by a comparative consideration of the assets and liabilities of the
corporation. The "market value" is a composite photograph of
all the elements giving value to the capital stock. As surely as
the corporate indebtedness increases without a corresponding
increase of assets, the market value of the capital stock decreases
and vice versa. Therefore, starting with the market value of
the stock as a basis, it is apparent that there has already been a
deduction of the corporate indebtedness. New York has long
sustained the rule that the indebtedness should be specifically
deducted from the market value of the capital stock." This de-
duction is available to the corporation, since by statute individ-
uals are allowed the same deduction." But, as previously in-
dicated, one deduction is made when the market value of the
stock is taken as a basis, and by force of the statute a second de-
duction is effected.
The rule that the indebtedness shall be neither added nor de-
ducted is well established in Minnesota, Kentucky,' Pennsylvania,
'Commonwealth v. Henderson Bridge Co., (1896) 99 Ky. 623, 641,
642, 31 S. W. 486, 29 L. R. A. 73, aff'd in 166 U. S. 15o, 17 S. C. R. 532,
41 L. Ed. 953.
'State Board of Equalization v. People, (19Ol) 191 Ill. 528, 61 N. E.
339, 58 L. R. A. 513.
'State v. Duluth Gas & Water Co., (1899) 76 Minn. 96, 104, 78 N. NV.
1032, 57 L. R. A. 63.
"People ex rel. S. A. R. R. Co. v. Barker, (1894) 141 N. Y. 196, 36
N. E. 184; People ex rel. Cornell S. Co. v. Dederick, (igoo) I61 N. Y.
195, 209, 55 N. E. 927. Apparently a statutory deduction of the corporate
indebtedness is provided in North Dakota. See Grand Forks County v.
Cream of Wheat Co., (1918) 41 N. D. 330, 343, 17o N. W. 863.
"Revised Statutes and General Laws of N. Y., vol. 3, c. 24, Art. i,
sec. 6a, p. 3530.
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Iowa, Oklahoma, and Missouri." As stated before, the use of
the market value of the stock as a basis has the effect of a de-
duction of the corporate indebtedness. Why should corporations
in these states be taxed upon the "market value," i. e., the net
value of the stock, instead of on the gross value thereof? The
landowner cannot thus deduct his indebtedness, nor can a mer-
chant, but a corporation obtains a deduction indirectly by the fact
that the market value of its stock is below par. For instance, a
corporation free from debt has capital stock, including its fran-
chise, to the value of $10,000. If the same corporation, still re-
taining the same property, is, however, indebted $5,000, this re-
duces the aggregate value of the stock on the market to $5,000,
Clearly a rule of assessment taxing this amount is incorrect in
that it exempts the corporation to the extent of its indebtedness
and gives the corporation an unfair advantage over the individual.
The rule that the indebtedness should be added tq the market
value appears to be, after careful analysis, the most logical and
reasonable basis of assessment. It has been ably expounded by
the Illinois court, on the theory that the indebtedness has, in fact,
been deducted in fixing the market value of the shares of capital
stock, and that since the corporation is not entitled to this de-
duction, it is necessary to add the value of the debt to counter-
balance the prior deduction.' The Minnesota court in the Duluth
Gas & Water Co. case 'recognized the double deduction resulting
from a statutory provision for a deduction of indebtedness from
the market value of the stock."4 Accordingly this provision was
omitted in the later statute.' Since by the better opinion a cor-
poration is not entitled to even one deduction, it might be well to
amend the present statute so as to conform to the rule applied in
Illinois.
"State v. Duluth Gas & Water Co., (i899) 76 Minn. 96, 1O4, 78 N. W.
1032, 57 L. R. A. 63; Commonwealth v. Henderson Bridge Co., (1896) 99
Ky. 623, 31 S. W. 486, 29 L. R. A. 73; Commonwealth v. N. Y., etc., R.
Co., (1898) 188 Pa. 169, 191, 41 Atl. 594; Mfarshalltown, etc., Co. v. Wel-
ker, (igig) 185 Ia. 165, 169, 17o N. W. 384; Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co.
v. Bd. of Com'rs, (Okla. 1918) 175 Pac. 227; State ex rel. Marquette Hotel
Inv. Co. v. State Tax Commission, (1920) 282 Mo. 213, 221 S. W. 721.
"Oak Ridge Cemetery Corp. v. Tax Commission, (Ill. 1921) 132 N. E.
553. This rule of assessment was approved by the United States Supreme
Court in State R. Tax Cases, (1875) 92 U. S. 575, 6o5, 23 L. Ed. 663.
"State v. Duluth Gas & Water Co., (1899) 76 \Minn. 96, 1O4, 78 N. W.
1032, 57 L. R. A. 63, by Mitchell, 3., "The practical effect of this provision
is to allow a double deduction of the amount of the corporate indebted-
ness."
"Minn. G. S. 1913, sec. 2015.
